Title: Examining the Detrimental Consequences of Israel's Divisive Policies Towards Palestinians

Hussein Ibish, a Senior Resident Scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, states that the outcome of Israel's current war will not be decided in Gaza, but rather in the West Bank.

Hussein Ibish

Israel needs to reconsider its approach towards the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the international stage if it wants to effectively diminish Hamas' influence among the Palestinian people in the long run.

Without strengthening these Palestinian groups, which still dominate the national movement, it is highly likely that Hamas and even more radical factions will continue to expand and gain support among the Palestinian population.

If Israel truly intends to significantly diminish Hamas's military and political influence, solely targeting the group's leaders, members, equipment, and infrastructure will not suffice. The void will be filled, and insurgencies have proven their ability to operate successfully with limited resources and under harsh circumstances.

Hamas, the early years

Because the Palestinian people, their cause, and their national movement are here to stay, the most effective approach to marginalize Hamas in the long run is to refrain from implementing a policy that simultaneously bolsters and undermines Palestinian factions. By avoiding this strategy, we can prevent them from becoming divided and consequently weak in their quest to achieve national objectives.

From the start, Israel pursued a destructive and irresponsible strategy by actively supporting Hamas to weaken and fragment the Palestinian national movement. Hamas originated in Gaza during the first Palestinian intifada in 1987, with its creation attributed to the Muslim Brotherhood. Israeli authorities saw this as a golden opportunity to exploit the emerging conflict between secular nationalists and Islamists within the occupied territories, in an attempt to undermine the unity of the Palestinian people.

Hamas was granted significant flexibility in organizing and establishing itself, as Israel chose to overlook the organization's early initiatives aimed at structuring and developing its activities. These actions would have faced severe suppression if undertaken by either Fatah-dominated organizations or the local grassroots committees that spearheaded the initial uprising during its early months.

During a moment of intense negotiations, Shimon Peres, the former Foreign Minister of Israel, successfully signs the Oslo Accords at the White House. Throughout this significant event in September 1993, esteemed individuals such as Yitzhak Rabin (the Israeli Prime Minister), President Bill Clinton, and Yasser Arafat (the Chairman of the PLO) observe the signing.

During the Oslo negotiations and the implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreements in the 1990s, there was a departure from the divisive strategy of divide and rule. Serious negotiations with the PLO and cooperation with the PA resulted in the formation of small Palestinian enclaves in the West Bank and Gaza.

However, the failure of the Camp David summit in 2000 and the eruption of the second intifada led to a shift in power to the Israeli right. Under leaders such as Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli right regained dominance in national politics and resumed the divide and rule approach.

Israels divide and rule approach

It appeared to culminate in a successful manner in 2007, as a period of divided governance within the Palestinians resulted in a Fatah presidency led by Mahmoud Abbas and a Hamas-dominated legislature collapsing into warfare with Hamas forcibly expelling Fatah and the PA from Gaza.

Netanyahu and his colleagues favored this split as it worked in their favor. Hamas's unwavering dedication to armed struggle and violence allowed the Israeli right to portray the entire Palestinian national movement as excessively radical.

Furthermore, the division between Gaza and the West Bank provided Israelis who opposed further negotiations with the Palestinians, potentially leading to a two-state solution, with a convenient excuse to refuse dialogue with the PLO. They argued that the PLO does not represent the entire Palestinian population.

In Gaza City's central Gaza Strip, wounded Palestinians can be seen sitting at the al-Shifa hospital. They have been transported from al-Ahli hospital after an explosion occurred there on Tuesday, October 17, 2023. The Health Ministry, which is controlled by Hamas, claims that the explosion resulted from an Israeli airstrike that claimed the lives of hundreds of individuals at al-Ahli. However, the Israeli military refutes this account and states that it was actually a misfired Palestinian rocket. (AP Photo/Abed Khaled)

Abed Khaled/AP

There's a smarter way to eliminate Hamas

For nearly two decades, Israel maintained a policy of keeping Hamas in power in Gaza, although they were besieged and confined. They would periodically engage in wars, cynically referred to as "mowing the grass," to weaken Hamas. Meanwhile, Israel also ensured that the Palestinian Authority continued to govern the self-administered areas in the West Bank, even though they were significantly weakened institutionally and politically.

Above all, the main objective seemed to be to prevent Palestinian unity, thereby obstructing any progress towards establishing a Palestinian state or imposing further restrictions on Israeli settlements. This aligns with Israel's openly declared national policy of eventually annexing more territories in the West Bank.

In March 2019, the Jerusalem Post reported that Netanyahu stated during a private meeting with Likud party Knesset members that those opposing a Palestinian state should support transferring funds to Hamas in Gaza. This action was seen as part of Israel's strategy to separate the Palestinians in Gaza from those in the West Bank. These policies, which had been diligently pursued by the Israeli right for many years, ultimately resulted in the October 7 massacres.

What Hamas did next

The Hamas attack on October 7 came as a surprise to Israelis, including the national security establishment. They were mistaken in thinking that both Palestinian groups were satisfied with their own territories and were willing to maintain a stalemate in their quest for dominance within the national movement, which worked in favor of Israel.

However, what the Israelis failed to realize is that since its establishment in 1987, Hamas has been determined to gain control of the Palestinian national movement and, ultimately, the PLO. This would give Hamas access to the PLO's valuable international diplomatic presence, which includes nonmember observer state status at the UN and over 100 embassies worldwide.

After the October 7 killing spree, it became immediately evident that Hamas, which was losing popularity, intended to assert its dominance within the national movement through acts of violence. It is apparent that Hamas anticipated a strong military response from Israel in Gaza, and it aims to incite a long-term Israeli security presence, in order to eventually organize a sustained and progressively stronger insurgency.

Given the circumstances following October 7, the most logical course of action for Israel is to decisively engage in serious and constructive dialogue with Palestinians who are committed to engaging with Israelis, rather than supporting those who seek to harm Israelis.

The aim is to highlight the significant difference between the armed resistance and the PA's security cooperation with Israel, along with the PLO's unwavering dedication to achieving independence through a two-state agreement with Israel. This contrast holds particular importance in the years ahead.

In light of the events on October 7, Israel is left with no other reasonable option but to prioritize engaging in sincere and productive discussions with Palestinians who are willing to communicate with Israelis, instead of supporting individuals who advocate for violence against Israelis.

Although this approach may contradict the inclinations of certain Israeli extremists in the present government, including Netanyahu, failure to initiate serious, constructive, and collaborative efforts with the PA, PLO, Hamas, and even more extremist factions will only result in the further growth and influence of these groups.

This entails implementing numerous evident actions to enhance the institutional and political strength of the PA, including enhancing its authority in the West Bank.

Moreover, it involves reestablishing dialogue with the PLO during negotiations, aiming to genuinely explore a feasible agreement that addresses the requirements of both populations.

Beyond Mahmoud Abbas

For many Israelis, it may seem difficult to envision a scenario where Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority and chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, is taken seriously. This is mainly because they have grown accustomed to perceiving him as a weak and ineffective leader. Additionally, Abbas has expressed his frustration through offensive language, particularly in relation to the Holocaust.

There is no doubt that Abbas is significantly outdated in almost every aspect. However, the elderly, frail, and chain-smoking politician, who consistently demonstrates his steadfast commitment to opposing violence as a Palestinian national strategy, embodies this prevailing trend among Palestinians. And in the not-so-distant future, when he inevitably exits the stage, he will be succeeded by individuals who share the same inclination.

Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority, and Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, pictured during the Middle East peace negotiations held at the White House in 2010.

Israelis must not center their attention on Abbas' personality, failures, or flaws as they navigate this critical strategic and political turning point. Rather, they should acknowledge that Israel's consistently hostile policies have played a significant role in molding Abbas into the deeply flawed figure he is today.

This individual, who currently leads the Palestinians, resigned as Yasser Arafat's Prime Minister amidst the second intifada. He willingly chose to embark on an indefinite period of isolation in the political realm because he vehemently opposed the use of violence.

Furthermore, the focus should not be on Abbas or his inner circle as individuals, but rather on empowering Palestinians who genuinely desire to reconcile with Jewish Israelis and who are the main hindrance to Hamas' potential political control among Palestinians.

It is obvious that Netanyahu and his government fail to comprehend the importance of this significant shift in policy. While the Biden administration seemingly comprehends the dilemma in principle, the extent to which they will take action to implement a revised approach towards the Palestinian political landscape remains uncertain at most.

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Considering the significant governance, security, and intelligence shortcomings exposed by the October 7 attack, which surpassed even the highest expectations of Hamas, it is imperative for Israelis to seek new leadership. Once they finally distance themselves from Netanyahu and the group of Jewish supremacists supporting him, it is crucial that the future Israeli strategic approach incorporates a certain level of comprehension regarding the Palestinian political landscape and Israel's true alternatives.

Choosing to deal seriously, respectfully, and constructively with sincere Palestinians who seek a negotiated agreement for peaceful coexistence is still possible. The repercussions of avoiding this path were evident on October 7th.

Israel cannot attain lasting security by inflicting death and destruction upon Gaza or any other place. The path to achieving true peace and security for Israelis lies in negotiating an agreement with Palestinian factions, led by Abbas, who, despite all challenges, still harbor the desire to reach a peace deal with Israel. This is the sole means through which Israelis can obtain genuine security and peace.