The Startling Truth: Why the 9/11 Attack Cannot Be Labeled as an Intelligence Failure
Delve into the realm of intelligence failures as Peter Bergen unravels the intricate parallels between the 9/11 terror attacks and the Hamas attack Gain insights through this thought-provoking analysis Subscribe to our newsletter for more compelling content
Peter Bergen, CNN's national security analyst and author of "The Rise and Fall of Osama bin Laden," draws comparisons between the attacks on 9/11 and the recent Hamas attacks in Israel. Both incidents involved terrorist organizations targeting innocent civilians, resulting in a sense of sudden and profound shock for both nations.
The attacks carried out by Hamas are often attributed to an intelligence failure, similar to how the 9/11 attacks were viewed. However, it is crucial to note that the 9/11 attacks weren't primarily an intelligence failure, but rather a failure in policy.
Intelligence agencies do not formulate policies; instead, they furnish information (which is often imperfect and incomplete) to aid policymakers in making well-informed decisions regarding the course of action.
On Saturday, October 7, 2023, police officers conducted an evacuation of a woman and a child from a location that had been targeted by a rocket fired from the Gaza Strip in Ashkelon, which is located in southern Israel. This incident coincided with Hamas declaring a fresh operation against Israel. The image is credited to Tsafrir Abayov/AP.
It is without a doubt that the Hamas attack on Israel can be classified as an act of terrorism.
During the period of spring and summer in 2001, numerous alerts were issued by the CIA indicating that al-Qaeda had plans for a major event. The George W. Bush administration received intelligence reports titled "Bin Ladin Planning High Profile Attacks," "Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent," and "Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delay." (The US government used the spelling "Bin Ladin" at that time.)
The most well-known of these warnings, titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in United States," was briefed to Bush at his Texas ranch on August 6, 2001. However, the Bush administration failed to take significant action in response to these warnings during the summer of 2001.
The reason we now have this knowledge is due to the commendable efforts of the 9/11 Commission. The Bush administration reluctantly established an investigative commission over a year after the attacks, under intense public pressure from the families of the 9/11 victims.
The Hamas attacks in Israel, like 9/11, came as a surprise, but it would be premature to consider it an intelligence failure. The information shared by Israeli intelligence agencies, such as Shin Bet, with Israeli policymakers regarding Hamas remains unknown, just as the CIA's communication with the Bush administration about al Qaeda's intentions was not revealed until a year after the 9/11 attacks. Government officials often blame a lack of intelligence for policy failures, as the facts are usually classified and the spy agencies typically cannot publicly defend themselves. Moreover, these agencies ultimately work for the policymakers.
Rockets are fired toward Israel from the Gaza Strip, Saturday, Oct. 7, 2023. The rockets were fired as Hamas announced a new operation against Israel.
Fatima Shbair/AP
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Following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush, who had previously experienced low approval ratings, saw a significant surge in popularity, reaching the highest polling numbers for any president in decades. This rise in favorability was attributed to the "rally around the flag" effect that typically occurs after a widespread tragedy. Similarly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to benefit from this effect, at least temporarily, in response to the Hamas attacks.
However, as time passes and the initial shock wears off, it is likely that the Israeli public will demand an explanation for the apparent security failure. Currently, there is no information regarding whether Israeli intelligence received any warning signs amidst the overwhelming quantity of information. It is often easier to identify these warning signs in hindsight than in the present moment.
In her 1962 study, titled "Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision," Roberta Wohlstetter demonstrated how distinguishing between crucial information and irrelevant noise during the Japanese surprise attack on the US naval base on December 7, 1941, proved simpler in hindsight. She noted that "after the event, a signal becomes crystal clear, revealing the disaster it foretold. However, before the event, it remains obscured and fraught with conflicting interpretations, surrounded by a sea of useless and inconsequential data."
The Yom Kippur War, which occurred almost exactly fifty years ago, serves as a prime example of this phenomenon. It too caught Israel off guard, as Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack. At the time, Israeli policymakers mistakenly interpreted Egyptian and Syrian troop movements as mere exercises rather than preparations for war, resulting in what was later labeled an intelligence failure.
According to former CIA official Bruce Riedel, Israeli officials were skeptical about the possibility of Egypt and Syria starting a war that they were likely to lose. However, it was later discovered that this assumption was incorrect. A declassified US government report on the Yom Kippur War revealed that the intelligence indicating the Egyptians and Syrians were planning an attack was abundant, foreboding, and frequently accurate.
The Israeli mistake 50 years ago, as well as the oversight by the Bush administration prior to 9/11, involved underestimating the capabilities of their adversaries despite prior intelligence warnings. It is currently unclear what information, if any, the Netanyahu government was informed regarding a potential attack from Gaza. Nevertheless, considering the extensive scale of the attacks, it is feasible to assume that there were some indications indicating an imminent assault. The Israelis will only discover whether there is a genuine need for prompt responsibility and if the Netanyahu government is willing to address it.
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Currently, the Israelis are primarily concentrating on the ongoing conflict. Lt. Col. Richard Hecht, the international spokesperson for the Israeli Defense Forces, expressed, "We were taken aback this morning. As of now, I would rather avoid discussing any failures. We are engaged in warfare and focused on fighting. I am certain this will be a significant issue once this situation concludes."
I believe the matter of intelligence will be discussed in the future, and we will eventually find out what transpired.
In numerous instances of unexpected attacks, such as Pearl Harbor, the Yom Kippur War, and 9/11, it has been revealed that intelligence relevant to the threats was provided to policymakers. However, it was disregarded because it contradicted their preconceived notions regarding the nature and magnitude of the danger.
